Although I believe the proponents of this approach are well-intentioned, I think it faces an important conceptual difficulty. For example, it is said to remain “focused on the value of the Dharma.” But what exactly is meant by Dharma?

If Dharma refers to the body of teachings of the historical Buddha, an internal tension arises. Buddhist teachings are not presented merely as a set of techniques for promoting psychological well-being, but as a description of reality and of the way beings exist within the cycle of saṃsāra. In this context, practice, ethics, psychology, and spiritual realization are all integrated into a particular metaphysical understanding of existence.

This can be seen in the Four Noble Truths. The First Noble Truth states that birth, aging, illness, and death are dukkha. If we abandon the doctrines of karma and rebirth, this statement loses a significant part of its foundation. It is relatively easy to understand why illness is unpleasant, but why should birth, aging, and even death necessarily be dukkha?

In the traditional Buddhist understanding, the answer is clear: these experiences belong to the cycle of saṃsāra. They are suffering not merely because they may be emotionally painful, but because they represent the continuation of conditioned existence, governed by karma and ignorance. As long as there is rebirth, there will repeatedly be birth, aging, illness, and death.

From this perspective, the Four Noble Truths describe the very structure of reality. There is a mode of existence characterized by dukkha; there is its cause (samudaya), consisting of attachment and the karmic processes that perpetuate rebirth; there is its cessation (nirodha), which is the definitive liberation from this cycle; and there is the path (mārga), which leads precisely to that liberation.

Thus, birth, aging, illness, and death constitute dukkha because they belong to conditioned existence. Craving is the cause of suffering because it continually generates the conditions for further rebirth. And the Noble Eightfold Path exists precisely because it leads to the definitive cessation of this process.

In other words, the Buddha is not merely describing a psychological state of suffering, but an ontological condition of existence. Suffering is not simply the experience of unpleasant emotions; it is remaining bound to the cycle of birth and death.

This also helps us understand practices such as the Four Foundations of Mindfulness (Satipaṭṭhāna). Contemplating the impermanence of the body, feelings, the mind, and phenomena is not primarily intended to reduce anxiety or increase mindfulness (indeed, these contemplations can at times be quite distressing). Rather, their purpose is to weaken attachment to conditioned existence and ultimately lead to the end of rebirth.

If, however, rebirth is discarded, the meaning of this practice changes profoundly. After all, what is the ultimate reason for cultivating detachment from the body, from sensations, and from existence itself if this is the only life we possess?

One might argue that contemplating impermanence would still produce psychological serenity. However, it also seems plausible that it could have the opposite effect. Precisely because one recognizes that everything is transient and that this is the only existence one will ever have, one may come to value it even more intensely. Instead of diminishing attachment, awareness of finitude could actually reinforce it.

This shift in foundations also has ethical implications. In the Buddhist tradition, refraining from actions motivated by craving is not simply a matter of avoiding immediate consequences, but of interrupting the production of karma that perpetuates future suffering. Without karma and rebirth, that motivation disappears.

Imagine someone overwhelmed by a powerful desire that cannot be satisfied through morally legitimate means. In traditional Buddhism, that person understands that yielding to the desire generates karma and prolongs the cycle of suffering, and this provides a compelling reason to refrain from acting on it. By contrast, within a framework that rejects karma and rebirth, the reasoning might instead become: “This desire is impermanent; it will eventually disappear whether I satisfy it or not. But if there are no consequences beyond this life, perhaps it is better to satisfy it before it fades away.”

Advocates of Secular Buddhism may naturally reply that there are humanistic or utilitarian reasons for acting morally. That may well be true. However, such reasons no longer derive from the Dharma as taught by the Buddha, but from an independent philosophical ethic.

For this reason, the central question is not whether Secular Buddhism can produce ethical people or promote psychological well-being. It certainly can. The real question is different: once karma, rebirth, and saṃsāra have been rejected, can we still meaningfully speak of Dharma? Can this still properly be called Buddhism? Or are we instead dealing with a secular humanist philosophy grounded in different assumptions that draws inspiration from Buddhist ideas?

I believe that a secular humanist philosophy is entirely legitimate and can certainly draw inspiration from elements of the Buddhist tradition. However, that alone is not sufficient for it to be regarded as a form of Buddhism.

Furthermore, if the goal is to construct an authentically secular philosophy of life, it may be more coherent to engage freely with a variety of contemplative and ethical traditions rather than limiting oneself to Buddhism. In this regard, among the major traditions of the East, (Neo-)Confucianism offers particularly fertile ground for a secular philosophy of self-cultivation. Its core is concerned with character formation, moral development, personal discipline, and social responsibility, without requiring, for the coherence of its practices, a soteriological cosmology as robust as that of Buddhism. For this reason, it may provide a more philosophically consistent foundation for a secular humanist project than a reconstruction of Buddhism stripped of its metaphysical assumptions.